that provided criminal defendants with the right to subpoena the prosecution's forensic analyst in lieu of confrontation, many commentators thought the question had been resolved by Melendez-Diaz. In fact, the unusual sequencing led to speculation about whether Melendez-Diaz would be overruled or limited and about the potentially pivotal role the Supreme Court's recent failure to discuss evidentiary challenges to forensic science may be that Melendez-Diaz and Daubert reflect two different approaches to the same problem. The Daubert Court assumed that cross-examination was inadequate to the task of exposing and neutralizing specious expertise and that judges would be more accurate and consistent arbiters of scientific validity.'
7 After almost two decades of continued reliance on numerous forms of specious forensic evidence as documented in the NAS Report, Melendez-Diaz now suggests that confrontation can compensate for judges' failure to screen seriously deficient expert evidence.8 Apparently, the Melendez-Diaz plurality believed that confrontation will succeed where Daubert has failed because "the analyst who provides false results may, under oath in open court, reconsider his false testimony" and because " [c] onfrontation is designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well."' 9 Thus, at least for prosecution-sponsored expert evidence, Melendez-Diaz embraces the idea rejected by Daubert-that cross-examination will ensure that law does not rely on bad science. 20 There are good reasons to doubt that cross-examination is the right tool for this laudable purpose. In specific cases, defense counsel may prefer not to provide prosecution experts with the opportunity to flaunt their expertise. For example, in Professors Garrett and Neufeld's recent study of forensic science evidence proffered by prosecutors in 137 cases where defendants were subsequently exonerated using DNA, they found that " [d] efense counsel rarely made any objections to the invalid forensic science testimony in these trials and rarely effectively cross-examined forensic analysts who provided invalid science testimony."21 As a more general matter, Melendez-Diaz reinforces the idea (rejected in Daubert) that "[c]ross-examination is not merely accorded historic or structural importance in the adversary process; [but] it is also regarded as a panacea, a cure-all." 22 However, as Professor Jules Epstein recently opined, in 43 M.J. 379, 384 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (using four factors from Daubert to evaluate expert testimony). 17 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) ("Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must determine at the outset ... whether the expert is proposing to testify to . . . scientific knowledge . .. ."). However, the Daubert Court did acknowledge that after the gatekeeper judge had evaluated the proffered evidence, litigants might use "traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence," which could include " [v] igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof." Id. at 596. many cases cross-examination of experts "actually impedes accurate fact-finding because leading questions are not always an appropriate or sufficient tool for truth finding ... [and because] it lacks utility when confronting the honest-but-mistaken witness." 23 Regardless of whether Melendez-Diaz has the effect of neutralizing some of the specious forensic evidence that sneaks in under the Daubert gate, the new extension of the Confrontation Clause to forensic analysts has implications for both the practice of criminal law and the interpretation of constitutional doctrine.
In practice, although Melendez-Diaz is just over a year old, the case has already begun to confound the lower courts. A narrow reading of Melendez-Diaz would bar admission only of out-of-court statements by unavailable, nontestifying, prosecution-sponsored forensic experts when these statements are deemed "testimonial" because they are embodied within an affidavit or a similarly formalized document.24 However, Melendez-Diaz has proved almost impossible for the lower courts to decipher or apply. Over the past few months, state courts across the country have struggled to determine which lab reports (and other state records) are "testimonial statements" mandating confrontation. 25 In fact, the postMelendez-Diaz cases are so disparate and bizarre that they include decisions based (in whole or part) on the following factors: (1) whether a lab analyst subjectively anticipated that his autopsy report would be used in court; (2) whether a state requires that forensic reports be certified or accompanied by some form of attestation; (3) whether prosecutors can avoid confrontation by having testifying analysts describe lab reports prepared by non-testifying analysts (if they do not introduce the report in evidence); (4) whether the test and report were contemporaneous; (5) whether Melendez-Diaz is understood to guarantee confrontation of testimonial statements relating to experts' methods or conclusions; (6) whether expert reports were created as part of a standard lab protocol without any effort to incriminate the defendant; and (7) efforts to reconcile Melendez-Diaz with Federal Rule of Evidence 703 or its state corollaries (which have long allowed experts to testify to opinions based on inadmissible evidence including out-of-court statements by non-testifying witnesses). Diaz) . 26 See infra Part VI.A (describing the effect of the Melendez-Diaz decision on challenges to forensic evidence and experts).
end run around the Sixth Amendment would have the paradoxical effect of making less reliable state records more readily admissible.
The doctrinal implications of Melendez-Diaz are equally complex. MelendezDiaz seems to blend originalist and historical concerns about the Confrontation Clause with contemporary data about problems within the forensic community. Thus, it provokes, but does not resolve, questions that implicate numerous assumptions about the nature and purpose of confrontation, how the scope of the clause should be defined, and how expert evidence can and should be challenged. Melendez-Diaz itself offers little guidance. Although the Melendez-Diaz plurality acknowledged that "there are other ways-and in some cases better ways-to challenge or verify the results of a forensic test," 2 7 in Justice Scalia's view, any other way would not be a sufficient alternative, because "the Constitution guarantees one way: confrontation." 2 8 Of course, this outcome was predetermined when the plurality deemed the certified lab report a "testimonial statement."
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This Article focuses on the NAS Report and the relationship between the concerns embodied within the report and the rapidly evolving confrontation doctrine. My thesis is that, taken together, these developments suggest that the "Daubert Revolution" has failed, at least in the criminal courts. Accordingly, the "path forward" charted by the NAS Report and the Melendez-Diaz Court does not lead to a Daubert-style solution involving better pretrial judicial screening or more conscientious application of evidentiary rules and standards. Instead, change should be sought in new directions, including coordinated efforts to standardize and improve the forensic fields and newly "constitutionalized" opportunities for criminal defendants to use cross-examination to expose specious and fraudulent forensic evidence.
This Article examines the practical and doctrinal implications of this new approach. Part I describes the origins of the NAS Report, including the creation of the committee and the congressional charge. Part II explores the NAS Report recommendations for the forensic fields and the recommendations for future criminal courts. Part III predicts the likely impact of these recommendations on both the forensic community and the courts. Part IV describes the Melendez-Diaz case and places the decision in its appropriate confrontation context. Part V explains how and why the Melendez-Diaz plurality's reliance on the NAS Report reflects an effort to constitutionalize concerns about forensic evidence and experts. Finally, Part VI anticipates the future of Melendez-Diaz by exploring its impact on the lower courts and the likely implications of these new developments for the future of forensic science and law. 27 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536. 28 Id.
29 Id. at 2532.
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I. THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES REPORT

A. The Creation of the Forensic Science Committee
The NAS Report is based on a study authorized by Congress in November 2005.30 Four years ago, Congress charged the NAS with the creation of a new independent Forensic Science Committee ("FSC") that would "assess the present and future resource needs of the forensic science community ... [in order to] make recommendations for maximizing the use of forensic technologies and techniques to solve crimes, investigate deaths, and protect the public." 3 ' The FSC was cochaired by Judge Harry T. Edwards of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and Dr. Constantine Gatsonsis, a professor of biostatistics at Brown University.
32 It was composed of forensic science practitioners, a variety of other scientists, and members of the legal community. Over the past four years, the committee heard testimony from many members of the forensic science community, including analysts from the FBI, the United States Secret Service, the National Institute of Justice, and other forensic science professional associations and advocacy groups. 34 The committee also gathered evidence from judges, lawyers, and legal scholars.
The creation of the FSC reflected the most recent serious national effort to identify problems of validity and consistency across the range of forensic science fields and to shape the future of forensic evidence in our courts. Although the NAS Report may have the broadest scope and the longest view, this was not the first federally funded investigation into the forensic science community. For example, a decade earlier, the National Institute of Justice published a report entitled Forensic Sciences: Review of Status and Needs. 6 Although the scope and detail of the earlier report were not as extensive as the NAS Report, the earlier report raised similar concerns about the need for-more funding, better research, and greater standardization and coordination among local, state, and federal crime laboratories. 37 The NAS has also generated previous reports on a variety of specific forensic questions including DNA analysis 38 and ballistics identification.
39
30 NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. 31 Id. at 1-2 (citing S. REP 
B. The Congressional Charge
The congressional charge to the FSC echoed concerns raised within and outside the forensic fields. In sum Congress instructed the FSC to identify the resource needs of state and local crime labs, make recommendations to maximize the use of existing forensic technologies, make recommendations that will increase the number of qualified forensic scientists, and disseminate practice guidelines for collecting and analyzing forensic evidence.
4 0 Thus, the NAS Report was designed to provide current data on the general quality of forensic science and to generate specific recommendations that could be used to strengthen the forensic science community. The overarching goal was to improve the forensic science community's ability to contribute to a fair and effective criminal justice system. In response to specific concerns about the forensic science community, the FSC engaged in an ambitious effort to understand the spectrum of forensic fields and their operation at the federal, state, and local levels. 42 This focus reflected the fact that much of the impetus for the NAS Report had come from individuals within the forensic science community (some of whom were likely motivated by the significant lack of funding, especially among state and local crime labs).
4 3 Over the past four years, the FSC explored a range of forensic fields including analysis of fingerprints, shoe prints, tire tracks, tool marks, firearms, hair, fiber, handwriting, paint, explosives, fire debris, bite marks, and bloodstains." The scope of this inquiry required the FSC to gather information from a wide range of forensic science laboratories and service providers, including crime labs operated by the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Department of Defense, the National Bioforensic Analysis Center, the National Counterproliferation Center, 
C. Forensic Science in the Criminal Courts
In response to specific concerns about the admission and use of forensic science evidence in court, the FSC also examined both the extant and potential interplay between forensic science and law. 46 Although the FSC analysis of forensic science in litigation was limited to the federal criminal courts, this is an essential component of the NAS Report because, with the notable exception of DNA analysis, courts are the only real consumers of forensic evidence.
As part of the FSC exploration of the admission and use of forensic evidence in the criminal courts, the committee assessed the effectiveness of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the operation of Daubert challenges.
4 7 The NAS Report recommendations are discussed in detail below.
4 8 However, in essence the NAS Report concluded that there are vast systemic problems with the use of forensic science in criminal litigation because courts "continue to rely on forensic evidence without fully understanding and addressing the limitations of different forensic science disciplines." 4 9 Moreover, according to the NAS Report, seventeen years after Daubert required that judges pre-screen challenged expertise to determine whether it is "scientific knowledge," 50 there has been little improvement in the quality of forensic evidence. In the view of the FSC, this is because courts "have not with any consistency or clarity imposed standards ensuring the application of scientifically valid reasoning and reliable methodology in criminal cases involving Daubert questions."
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II. THE NAS REPORT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Recommendations for the Forensic Science Community
The FSC explicitly acknowledged that the forensic science community suffers from systemic structural problems. In fact, these problems are so pervasive that any accurate assessment of the forensic science community is impeded by its fragmented nature, which "makes it difficult to gather data on the entire universe 45 See id. at 4, 57-77. 46 See id. at 85-88. 47 See id. at 90-98. 48 of forensic service entities and activities." 54 As the NAS Report revealed, the forensic science community is subdivided among a vast spectrum of distinct fields. 55 It is further fragmented by the fact that forensic techniques are practiced in autonomous laboratories that operate at the local, state, and federal levels.
56
Despite these impediments to a comprehensive understanding of the range of forensic fields, the FSC found that "the large amount of information provided to the committee by people engaged in the forensic science enterprise and by experts who have studied how well that enterprise functions all points to a system that lacks coordination and that is underresourced in many ways." 57 Moreover, because most of the forensic scientific community lacks adequate funding and consistent professional standards, existing problems are further compounded by the fact that many forensic analyses are performed by "practitioners with different levels of education and training and different professional cultures and standards for performance."
The FSC also recognized that most forensic fields suffer from endemic localized problems engendered by the nature of their common objective. 59 Forensic fields almost invariably engage in a process of "individualization." The goal of individualization is to match evidence found at a crime scene or on a law enforcement database to a specific suspect. 60 Although the process may utilize a range of technologies, a vital component of most forensic individualization is the subjective analysis of the human interpreter.
6 1 Recently, much has been written about both covert and overt bias among forensic scientists, 62 including at least one essay complaining that this social science evidence was given short shrift by the FSC. 63 To be fair, the NAS Report attempted to address a wide range of specific lab analyst problems including human observer bias, lack of consistent education and training requirements, inconsistent terminology, and the lack of uniform lab accreditation and employee certification standards. 54 Id. at 77. 5s See id. at 78. 56 See id. at 77-78. 5 Id. at 77 (emphasis added). In light of the spectrum of forensic disciplines and the range of concerns, the NAS Report does not contain any one-size-fits-all forensic science community recommendations. To the extent there are any general findings, they are embodied within the FSC's conclusion that "forensic laboratories are underresourced and understaffed" 5 and "the knowledge base that underpins [forensic] analysis and interpretation of evidence-are not as strong as they could be" 66 in part because "[t]he forensic science system . .. has only thin ties to an academic research base that could support the forensic science disciplines and fill knowledge gaps." More general conclusions are also contained within the finding that "[w]ith the exception of nuclear DNA analysis . . . no forensic method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific or individual source." 68 The NAS Report includes thirteen specific recommendations responsive to the committee's congressional charge. These begin with the threshold recommendation that Congress create and fund an independent federal National Institute of Forensic Science ["NIFS"]. 70 The remaining twelve recommendations principally elaborate on how a new NIFS could transform the forensic science community. 1 These recommendations are described in some detail in the report, 72 but they can be summarized as follows: (1) establish standard terminology to be used within the forensic fields to report on and testify about forensic science investigations; 73 (2) fund peer-reviewed research to demonstrate the validity of forensic methods and develop and establish quantifiable measures of the validity of forensic analyses (including quantifiable measures of uncertainty in conclusions); 74 (3) maximize the independence of forensic laboratories and professionals from law enforcement and prosecutors' offices; 75 (4) "encourage research programs on human observer bias and sources of human error in forensic examinations"; 76 (5) work with the National Institute of Standards and Technology to advance standards that would control "measurement, validation, reliability, information sharing, and proficiency testing in forensic science and to establish protocols for forensic examinations"; 7 7 (6) ensure mandatory laboratory accreditation and mandatory individual certification of forensic science professionals; 7 8 (7) "establish routine quality assurance and quality control procedures"; 79 (8) "establish a national code of ethics for all forensic science disciplines"; 80 (9) improve and develop graduate education programs in multidisciplinary fields essential to the practice of forensic science; 8 1 (10) improve the quality of medico-legal death investigations; 82 (11) "launch a new broad-based effort to achieve nationwide fingerprint data interoperability"; 8 3 and (12) work with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the FBI, forensic scientists, and crime scene investigators to ensure the capacity to manage and analyze evidence from future events that affect homeland security. 84 As discussed below, some insight into the viability of these recommendations might be gleaned from recent congressional hearings on the NAS Report.
B. Recommendations for the Criminal Courts
The FSC examined the interplay between forensic science and law by exploring the admission of forensic science evidence in criminal litigation.
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According to the NAS Report, "[t]he law's greatest dilemma in its heavy reliance on forensic evidence, however, concerns the question of whether-and to what extent-there is science in any given 'forensic science' discipline." 86
The Failure of Daubert
The question of whether there is science in any scientific evidence has preoccupied evidence scholars (at least) since 1993, when the Supreme Court was galvanized into action in Daubert v. Merrell Dow. 87 I have written elsewhere about the myopic post-Daubert approach to the broad range of science and law questions, 88 but the NAS Report further supports the conclusion that a postDaubert emphasis on "rules governing the admissibility of forensic evidence [and] inadequate to the task of curing the documented ills of the forensic science disciplines." 89 As the NAS Report recognized, almost two decades after Daubert, trial courts "continue to rely on forensic evidence without fully understanding and addressing the limitations of different forensic science disciplines."
90 These systemic problems are compounded by appellate courts that "have not with any consistency or clarity imposed standards ensuring the application of scientifically valid reasoning and reliable methodology in criminal cases involving Daubert questions." 9 1
Impediments to Doctrinal Analysis
After acknowledging the failures of the existing legal regime to effectively root out specious forensic science, the NAS Report proposed that a better approach would start with two very important questions that should underlie the law's admission of and reliance upon forensic evidence in criminal trials: (1) the extent to which a particular forensic discipline is founded on a reliable scientific methodology that gives it the capacity to accurately analyze evidence and report findings and (2) the extent to which practitioners in a particular forensic discipline rely on human interpretation that could be tainted by error, the threat of bias, of the absence of sound operational procedures and robust,performance standards.
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However, discerning the validity of the range of forensic science methodologies and their reliance on subjective human interpretation is a difficult, complex, and time-consuming task. It is also a task that many members of both the forensic and legal communities (because of their traditional interdependence) may not be anxious to undertake.
Moreover, even if we assume that during the post-Daubert period the operation of the admissibility rules and standards has generally improved, these developments are extremely difficult to identify or measure. When expert evidence is challenged, trial courts frequently issue judgments on the admission of evidence without published opinions; especially in criminal cases and even in the federal courts, evidentiary rulings are only infrequently subject to appellate review. 93 See id. at 11-12, 110 (noting the "highly deferential nature of the appellate review afforded trial courts' Daubert rulings").
criminal cases."
94 This may explain why there have been few efforts to quantify Daubert's real impact on the criminal and civil courts.
Two Models of Valid Forensic Science
Perhaps in an effort to illustrate that scientists and courts sometimes get it right, the NAS Report also discussed two forensic fields where both the science and law are generally sound. 95 The report described the fact that, like most forensic evidence, nuclear DNA evidence is universally accepted for individualization purposes in U.S. courts. However, unlike most forensic evidence, judges and jurors should rely on DNA evidence because this evidence is the product of the only forensic method that "has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or source." 9 The second forensic field identified with approval by the FSC, drug identification, poses fewer problems because the analysts' goal is not individualization. Forensic drug identification generally relies on widely accepted principles and technologies of chemical analysis, and the analyst's goal is limited to determining the chemical composition of the recovered substance. 98 Thus, forensic substance identification evidence is also routinely and appropriately admitted in the criminal courts. 99 his team report that they were able to fabricate both blood and saliva samples that contained non-donor DNA. Id. Perhaps even more troubling, they claim that, without access to biological source material, they could build a sample of DNA to match a DNA database profile. Id. However, this is very new research and, as the article indicates, Dr. Frumkin is a founder of Nucleix, a for-profit Israeli company that has developed a test designed to distinguish fake DNA that Nucleix plans to market to forensics laboratories throughout the world. Id. 98 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 134.
9
See id. at 101-02.
'" See id. at 7, 102.
Avoiding the Vicious Circle
The NAS Report recognized that the legal system creates bad incentives for the forensic community and vice-versa.' 0 Despite the evidentiary rules and Daubert, judges consistently fail to prevent "forensic science methodolog [ies] [from being] condoned by the courts before the techniques have been properly studied and their accuracy verified."' 0 2 For example, even when defendants raise Daubert objections, forensic evidence is routinely admitted without serious judicial scrutiny, and this evidence includes "'even the most vulnerable forensic scienceshair microscopy, bite marks, and .handwriting."' 03 These problems are further compounded when judges admit this evidence "'[by] citing earlier decisions rather than facts established at a hearing.""' In most forensic fields, there is "'no evident reason why [rigorous, systematic] research would be infeasible"'; 0 5 but it is simply not being done. In fact, many judges "appear to be loath to insist on such [rigorous, systematic] research as a condition of admitting forensic science evidence in criminal cases, perhaps because to do so would likely 'demand more by way of validation [than] disciplines can presently offer."" 06 These problems will likely multiply in the future as the courts continue to rely on an everexpanding range of forensic evidence.
The Future ofForensic Evidence in the Criminal Courts
Although the bulk of the NAS Report recommendations focused on improving the practice of forensic science, not the practice of law, law and forensic science are increasingly interdependent.
Forensic science is crucial to the criminal justice system from start to finish. During an investigation, forensic science evidence is a vital exculpatory tool, often excluding potential suspects and narrowing the focus of investigations for the police. Forensic evidence may provide important clues to places, objects or people that can lead police to an arrest before another crime has been committed by a particular individual, thus harnessing the power of crime prevention. In a postmortem context, forensic examinations are imperative for suspicious 101 See id. at 16-17 (asserting that the forensic science field needs strong governance to encourage jurisdictions to adopt best practices and discourage bad practices). forensic evidence often expedites dispositions of cases and, frequently, when confronted with the results of forensic analyses, defendants choose to accept a plea rather than assume the risk of going to trial. At trial, forensic evidence and the expert testimony proffered by forensic scientists can be key to securing a conviction or appropriate sentence. 10 7 As discussed above, the NAS Report proposes long-term, systemic, transformative recommendations for the forensic community designed to ensure that future "forensic science experts will be better able to analyze evidence and coherently report their findings in court." 0 8 The report was released in early 2009, in response to significant concerns from within and outside the forensic fields. Although the NAS Report recommended a path forward to a future of science-based forensic evidence, implementing these recommendations will require substantial administrative coordination and a significant allocation of funds. Over the past few months, Congress has begun to consider the costs and benefits of the NAS Report recommendations.
III. PREDICTING THE IMPACT OF THE NAS REPORT
It is far too early to accurately assess the impact of the NAS Report on the forensic community. However, in the wake of its release, a number of congressional committees have held public hearings to consider how the federal government should respond to the report's recommendation. These hearings may provide some insight into the likely congressional response to the NAS Report. They may also reveal nascent congressional reaction to the proposal to create a new NIFS, which is a predicate to most of the other recommendations. As discussed in more detail below, the initial congressional response revealed little beyond an attempt to understand the details of the NAS Report. testimony suggesting that the NAS Report concerns are exaggerated, arguing that the creation of an NIFS is unnecessary or inappropriate, and revealing sensitivity to any Congressional response that might be viewed as undermining the legitimacy of the criminal justice system."' Because the NAS Report recommendations are structured so that most of the changes would be implemented through a new federally funded oversight agency,1 2 a threshold question for Congress is whether federal funds will be allocated to create an NIFS.
A. Predicting the Impact on the Forensic Science Community:
The Initial Congressional Response
Senate Judiciary Committee
Immediately after the NAS Report was released, the Senate Judiciary Committee met to consider its findings."' At this hearing, the committee's chairman, Senator Patrick Leahy, opined that the problems identified in the report were very serious because they "go to the heart of our criminal justice system."ll 4 Apparently, many of the NAS Report conclusions were unfamiliar to the committee members and to the public. For example, Senator Leahy noted that the NAS Report dispelled prevalent misconceptions regarding forensic science because it illuminated the fact that forensic methods bear little resemblance to "television shows like 'CSI, ' [because] forensic scientists too rarely get to review crime scene evidence in sleek, ultra-modern, state-of-the-art laboratories.""
House Committee on Science and Technology
That same month, the House Committee on Science and Technology held hearings on the NAS Report."' 6 The committee heard testimony from Professor Peter Neufeld, who is the co-director of the Innocence Project." 7 Professor Neufeld reminded the committee that that the criminal justice system relies heavily on a wide range of forensic evidence. 142 Senator Sessions, a former prosecutor, acknowledged that the NAS Report could create uncertainty about evidence long-relied upon by police, prosecutors, judges, and juries.
14 3 For example, without addressing any of the specific concerns raised in the NAS Report (which included a section on fingerprints and a discussion of the Brandon Mayfield Madrid-train bombing debacle),'" Senator Sessions said simply, "I don't accept the idea that they seem to suggest that fingerprints are not proven technology.,,1 decision. According to Senator Leahy, after Melendez-Diaz, cross-examination of prosecutors' expert witnesses should play a much more important role in routing out the type of specious forensic science evidence identified in the NAS Report because government-sponsored experts will now be forced to explain and defend their conclusions.
14 7 Senator Leahy suggested that Melendez-Diaz and the NAS Report together will enhance the quality of forensic evidence proffered by prosecutors in the nation's criminal courts.1 4 8 According to Senator Leahy, the Melendez-Diaz decision "stems from a recognition that forensic findings may not always be as reliable as we would hope or they might appear."l49 As the congressional hearings continue, additional information regarding the political and economic viability of the NAS Report recommendations will be revealed. 141 Diaz "that forensic examiners must present evidence in court and be subject to cross examination, rather than simply submitting reports of their findings. This Supreme Court holding stems from a recognition that forensic findings may not always be as reliable as we would hope, or they might appear").
148 Id. ("The report issued by the National Academy of Sciences earlier this year is detailed and far-reaching, and can provide a foundation for building broad consensus for change.").
149 id.
C. Predicting the Impact of the NAS Report on the Criminal Courts
Judges, prosecutors, defense counsel and legal commentators have just begun to speculate about the impact of the NAS Report on the courts. One of the first, Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried, has reflected upon the fact that in the past,
[the] NAS' issuance of reports has sometimes persuaded courts to change their stance on the admissibility of specific types of scientific evidence. ... When a scientific organization as large and highly respected as the NAS raises questions about the reliability of an expert technique, that development arguably proves the existence of a major controversy that is the antithesis of the general acceptance required by [United States v.] Frye.
50
Professor Imwinkelried may be correct that the NAS Report could have a more powerful effect in states still governed by Frye, because it may be used to effectively demonstrate a lack of "general acceptance." However, there is reason to believe that the NAS Report could have a similar impact in the federal courts and Daubert jurisdictions because (even under Daubert) judges continue to rely on "general acceptance" as an important admissibility criterion.1 5 Some commentators have also speculated that the NAS Report may prove useful to lawyers. Professor Imwinkelried has opined that the report's specific findings may generate better opportunities for lawyers to challenge individualization testimony based on matching fingerprints, toolmarks, firearms, hairs/fibers, handwriting, or bitemarks. correct that future lawyers (and especially future defense counsel) will begin to rely on the specific conclusions of the NAS Report to challenge "individualization"/source attribution evidence involving ballistics or fingerprint evidence, they are probably also correct that the data contained in the report could make these challenges more persuasive. Finally, some commentators have speculated that the NAS Report might spark systemic change in states that still rely on Frye.1 54 These predictions assume that the NAS Report will be viewed as revealing such serious problems within the forensic community that it would provoke Frye jurisdictions to convert to a Daubert standard.' 55 This, in turn, could result in greater scrutiny of the "traditional methodologies that Frye jurisdictions routinely admit as generally accepted." 5 6 These are all optimistic predictions. Clearly, the NAS Report has the capacity to illuminate specific problems for judges, lawyers, and jurors who must decide whether to admit and how to use different forms of forensic evidence. However, the more general impact of the NAS Report will be determined by the eventual congressional response and the overall reaction from the courts. So far, the most important response to the NAS Report from the courts came from the Supreme Court at the very end of the 2008-09 term.
IV. THE NAS REPORT IN THE SUPREME COURT:
MELENDEZ report should prompt additional Frye jurisdictions to rethink their standard for admitting scientific testimony."). 1ss See id. at 11 (noting that the NAS Report "could play a major rule in shaping the future treatment of expert evidence"). 156 See id. ("Many of the techniques discussed in the NAS report are traditional methodologies that Frye jurisdictions routinely admit as generally accepted. The argument could be made that the NAS report is potent evidence that the Frye test is ineffective in separating the wheat from the chaff."). Roberts the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause restricts otherwise admissible hearsay in two ways. First, it requires that the prosecution produce the "witness against" the defendant or demonstrate her unavailability.' 6 1 Second, if the witness is unavailable, "the [Confrontation] Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that 'there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule."'l 6 6 Prosecutors could satisfy the "indicia of reliability"' 67 requirement either (1) by convincing the court that the proffered outAmendment. Absent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to 'be confronted with' the analysts at trial.").
' 
Redefining the Confrontation Inquiry: The Testimonial Statement
The Crawford Court relied on the text and history of the Sixth Amendment to create a more vigorous confrontation standard.1 7 6 Justice Scalia began with a textualist analysis that initially appeared designed to address the question of who might be a "witness[] against" the accused.1 77 The majority cited to the 1828 edition of Webster's American Dictionary of the English Language, which defined a "'witness[]' against the accused"' 178 as one who "bear[s] testimony"' 79 and defined "testimony" as "a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."' 80 Justice Scalia also examined the history of the Confrontation Clause. Following a lengthy disquisition of the treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh along with other historical materials, the Court concluded that "the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused." 8 2 According to the majority, the text and history together led to the inference that "the Framers would not have allowed the admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination."
Thus, Crawford replaced the Ohio v. Roberts reliability focus with an entirely different inquiry. The Crawford Court concluded that "[t]he constitutional text, like the history underlying the common-law right of confrontation, thus reflects an especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement."' 8 4 Future courts attempting to understand the scope of a criminal defendant's confrontation right would now need to start by distinguishing testimonial statements from nontestimonial statements.
Despite the importance of this new task, the Crawford Court declined the opportunity to define testimonial statements.
18 5 Instead, Justice Scalia noted that, "[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations." 8 6
Crawford also contained dicta that (rather confusingly) 185 Id. at 68 ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial."').
186 Id.
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[No. 2 identified, but did not endorse, various possible alternative definitions.' 87 The narrowest definition would limit the right to confrontation to statements "contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions."
88 Both before and after Crawford, this definition would be a consistent favorite of Justice Thomas, and five years later he would rely on it to provide his critical fifth-vote concurrence in Melendez- Diaz.' 8 9 The two other alternatives construed testimonial statements more broadly. Under the second definition, testimonial statements might also include the functional equivalent of ex parte in-court testimony such as "affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially."l 90 Finally, under the third possible definition, judges might inquire into whether statements "were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial."1' 9 This final definition provoked Professor Ronald J. Allen to predict that Crawford would create a "spectacle of deciding what is testimonial by the oxymoronic standard of what, objectively speaking, the primary purpose of a government/citizen interaction might be"' 92 and that "the Crawford regime will be subject to just as much, if not more, ambiguity as what it replaced."' 
The Facts
The Melendez-Diaz case arose out of a Boston police investigation based on an informant's tip that Kmart employee Thomas Wright was engaged in suspicious activity.1 94 According to the tipster, Mr. Wright regularly received phone calls at work that were followed immediately by the arrival of a blue sedan. 195 Id.
Melendez-Diaz was one of two suspects arrested in the blue sedan. 19 s The three men were taken into custody.' 99 After they arrived at the police station, the officers discovered that an additional nineteen bags of white powder had been hidden in the back seat of the patrol car. 200 Melendez-Diaz was charged with distributing and trafficking in cocaine. 2 0 1 At his trial, the Commonwealth submitted three "certificates of analysis."
202 These certificates reported the amount of white powder seized from the defendant and detailed how the powder "[had] been 'examined with the following results: The substance was found to contain: Cocaine."' 20 3 As required by state law, the three certificates had been sworn to before a notary public.
2 04 The Massachusetts statutory design was quite clear. Certificates containing sworn statements describing the results of laboratory substance analyses provided prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and weight of the tested substance. 205 Thus, the Commonwealth could, but need not, provide live trial testimony from the lab analyst. At trial, the defendant objected to admission of the certificates as a violation of his confrontation rights as construed by the Supreme Court in Crawford.
2 06 The defendant's request was denied by the trial court, and the decision to admit the certificates was affirmed by the Massachusetts Appellate Court. 207 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 17, 2008. 208 In the wake of Crawford, there was substantial disagreement among the states regarding whether forensic lab reports were testimonial statements. Professor Jennifer Mnookin has explored the post-Crawford cases on expert evidence and confrontation.209 Her research, which was published three years after Crawford, revealed that courts across the country were using a range of criteria and reaching inconsistent results. 210 Presumably, the Supreme Court granted cert in MelendezDiaz to resolve these ongoing problems. However, as the post-Melendez-Diaz cases reveal, Melendez-Diaz has not resulted in a more consistent or systematic approach and may actually have added to the confusion.
The Post-Crawford Question: Are Forensic Lab Reports Testimonial Statements?
When Melendez-Diaz reached the Court in 2009, Justice Scalia wrote for an eclectic plurality that included Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. 21 1 Although the Melendez-Diaz plurality characterized the case as an easy question that required nothing more than a "straightforward application of our holding in Crawford," 2 12 the simplicity of the question is belied by both Justice Thomas's razor thin concurrence and Justice Kennedy's broad and vigorous dissent.
(a) Justice Scalia's Plurality Opinion
In the first few pages of the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia concluded that the certified lab certificates at issue were testimonial statements because: (1) they were affidavits, 213 (2) they were "'made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,"' 2 14 and (3) because "[w]e can safely assume that the analysts were aware of the affidavits' evidentiary purpose." 2 15 Ultimately the first rationale is the most important because it provides the only point of agreement with Justice Thomas, who added the fifth vote. Thus, the holding of Melendez-Diaz is rooted in a two-part analysis that starts from the assumption that certified lab reports are akin to affidavits and proceeds to the conclusion that, after Crawford, the Confrontation Clause precludes prosecutors from admitting affidavits and other similarly formalized statements because they are testimonial statements.
216
The Melendez-Diaz Court overstates the Crawford holding. As discussed above, the only statements that the Crawford Court defined as testimonial were "prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and police interrogations,, 217 The dissenters were deeply troubled by the new obstacles that state and federal prosecutors would now confront whenever they seek to introduce forensic evidence.
2 25 According to Justice Kennedy, by mandating that every criminal defendant has a right to cross-examination of forensic lab analysts, the Court "threatens to disrupt forensic investigations across the country and to put prosecutions nationwide at risk of dismissal based on erratic, all-too-frequent 218 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 ("There is little doubt that the documents at issue in this case fall within the 'core class of testimonial statements' thus described. Our description of that category mentions affidavits twice."). 219 See id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thus, the dissenters' most "immediate systemic concern is that the Court makes no attempt to acknowledge the real differences between laboratory analysts who perform scientific tests and other, more conventional witnesses-'witnesses' being the word the Framers used in the Confrontation Clause." 2 30 The plurality's jumbling together of expert and non-expert witnesses for confrontation purposes is, in the dissenters' view, attributable to
[t]he Court's fundamental mistake[, which] is to read the Confrontation Clause as referring to a kind of out-of-court statement-namely a testimonial statement-that must be excluded from evidence. The Clause does not refer to kinds of statements. Nor does the Clause contain the word 'testimonial.' The text, instead, refers to kinds of persons, namely, to 'witnesses against' the defendant. Although little has been written about Melendez-Diaz so far, one astute commentator has summarized this originalism debate as follows:
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy strive to determine the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, more specifically the word "witnesses," but arrive at differing conclusions. Scalia's version of originalism in Melendez-Diaz is bolder than the others. In his determination to get it right and avoid confusion, however, he downplays contrary historical evidence, serious practical concerns, and the amount of existing authority his rule will overrun. Thomas The NAS Report figured prominently in the Melendez-Diaz plurality opinion. Justice Scalia described the report as "a recent study conducted under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences" 237 that effectively revealed that "[t]he majority of [laboratories producing forensic evidence] are administered by law enforcement agencies, such as police departments, where the laboratory administrator reports to the head of the agency."
238 According to the plurality, the NAS Report concluded that administrative ties create evidentiary problems "[b]ecause forensic scientists often are driven in their work by a need to answer a particular question related to the issues of a particular case, [and] Although the Melendez-Diaz plurality cites extensively from the NAS Report, in a footnote, Justice Scalia explained that "[w]e discuss the report only to refute the suggestion that this category of evidence is uniquely reliable and that crossexamination of the analysts would be an empty formalism." 2 50 However, the text of the plurality's opinion belies this disavowal. First, if the Sixth Amendment clearly mandates confrontation, it cannot matter whether cross-examination is likely to be effective or fruitless; these practice considerations are irrelevant. Second, if the plurality is really only concerned with the rare case where experts claim that their conclusions are "uniquely reliable," 2 5 ' there would be no need to engage in such a lengthy discussion of the pervasive research and practice problems currently plaguing all of the forensic science fields. Finally, Justice Scalia's odd and unlikely claim that the need for confrontation would be just as great "if all analysts always possessed the scientific acumen of Mine. Curie and the veracity of Mother Theresa," further undermines the plurality's effort to disavow the significance of the NAS Report. 
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254 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2527.
Commonwealth." 2 56 However, if the defendant failed to request the subpoena, she lost the right to confront and cross-examine the analyst, and the lab report was admitted.
57
The question for the Briscoe Court, had been defined by Professor Richard D. Friedman in his petition to the Court as follows: "[i]f a state allows a prosecutor to introduce a certificate of a forensic laboratory analysis, without presenting the testimony of the analyst who prepared the certificate, does the state avoid violating the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment by providing that the accused has a right to call the analyst as his own -witness?" 25 8 The question presented by Briscoe seemed to have been resolved by Melendez-Diaz. In fact, Justice Scalia had explicitly rejected the Commonwealth's substantially identical claim in Melendez-Diaz that there had been "no Confrontation Clause violation in this case because petitioner had the ability to subpoena the analysts." 2 59 According to the Melendez-Diaz plurality, the opportunity for the defendant to subpoena the crime lab analyst "whether pursuant to state law or the Compulsory Process Clause-is no substitute for the right of confrontation . .. [because u]nlike the Confrontation Clause, those provisions are of no use to the defendant when the witness is unavailable or simply refuses to appear." 260 However, the Court's decision granting certiorari in Briscoe raised the possibility that a state statute guaranteeing a defendant the right to subpoena the prosecution's forensic analyst provided a constitutionally acceptable substitute for confrontation. The Court held arguments in Briscoe on January 11, 2010,261 and approximately two weeks later issued a unanimous, one-sentence per curium opinion vacating the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia and remanding the case for "further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion in Melendez-Diaz . . . . 262 Over the past year, as the Supreme Court was deciding how to proceed in Briscoe, state courts across the country have been struggling to decipher and apply Melendez-Diaz in a range of criminal cases involving prosecution-proffered forensic lab reports and other state records.
26 3 Although the Melendez-Diaz plurality may have intended to clarify some of the post-Crawford confusion on the nature of testimonial statements, a review of some of the new post-Meledez-Diaz cases reveals that the confrontation doctrine developing in our state criminal courts is utterly inconsistent. In fact, these new cases are so disparate and bizarre that decisions interpreting the scope of the Confrontation Clause have been based on factors that include: (1) whether a lab analyst subjectively anticipated that his autopsy report would be used in court; 2 64
(2) whether a state requires that forensic reports be certified or accompanied by some other form of attestation; 2 65 later, the Supreme Court expanded the criminal defendant's right to confrontation, citing the "[s]erious deficiencies [that] have been found in the forensic evidence used in criminal trials." 2 73 Together, the NAS Report and Melendez-Diaz raise important questions about how future courts should test the validity of proffered forensic evidence. For decades, and especially since Daubert was decided in 1993, these have traditionally been viewed as evidence questions and addressed with evidentiary rules and standards. However, the NAS Report and Melendez-Diaz offer new and different solutions. The NAS Report recommendations begin with an ambitious plan to centralize and coordinate the fields and to improve funding and support for legitimate forensic research. 274 These extrajudicial approaches require a substantial national commitment of time and money and the creation of new programs designed to improve oversight, increase standardization, and enhance interdisciplinary coordination. Melendez-Diaz opts for a more immediate constitutional solution designed to neutralize the impact of some forensic evidence by guaranteeing defendants the right to cross-examine prosecutors' experts. 275 This recent expansion of the Confrontation Clause purports to provide defendants with the power to expose the forensic analyst who "sacrifice Together, the NAS Report and Melendez-Diaz chart a new path forward that does not end at the Daubert destination of more accurate judicial screening. Instead, this path begins with constitutionally guaranteed confrontation of prosecutors' forensic experts in court and ends with the hope that by implementing some or all of the NAS Report extrajudicial recommendations (maybe) there will finally be some science in the forensic sciences.
